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                IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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                 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
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                          MARSHALL DIVISION
                                  ) ( CIVIL ACTION NO.
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   ALACRITECH, INC.
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                                       2:16-693-RWS-RSP
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   VS.
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                                      MARSHALL, TEXAS
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                                  ) (
                                      SEPTEMBER 4, 2019
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   CENTURYLINK, ET AL.
                                  )( 3:30 P.M.
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                           MOTION HEARING
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              BEFORE THE HONORABLE JUDGE ROY S. PAYNE
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                   UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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   FOR THE PLAINTIFF:
14
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    (Proceedings recorded by mechanical stenography, transcript
   produced on a CAT system.)
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COURT SECURITY OFFICER: All rise.
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            THE COURT: Good afternoon. Please be seated.
            For the record, we're here for the motion hearing
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   in Alacritech versus CenturyLink, et al., Consolidated Case
   No. 2:16-693 on our docket.
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            Would counsel state their appearances for the
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   record?
            MS. HENRY: Good afternoon, Your Honor. Claire
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   Henry for Plaintiff, Alacritech. I'm joined by Joe
   Paunovich and Michelle Clark.
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            MR. PAUNOVICH: Good afternoon, Your Honor.
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            THE COURT: Good afternoon.
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            Thank you, Ms. Henry.
            MR. STEPHENS: Good afternoon, Your Honor.
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   Gil Gillam, Garland Stephens, David Folsom for Intel, also
   our in-house counsel, John Edwards, is here, as well.
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   Ready to proceed, Your Honor.
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            THE COURT: All right. Thank you, Mr. Gillam.
            MR. DACUS: Afternoon, Your Honor. Deron Dacus
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   here on behalf of Dell and CenturyLink. And here with me
   is Brady Cox on behalf of Dell and Frank Pietrantonio on
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22
   behalf of CenturyLink. We're ready to proceed, Your Honor.
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            THE COURT: All right.
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            MS. SMITH: Good afternoon, Your Honor. Melissa
   Smith on behalf of Cavium, and I'm joined by Karineh
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Khachatourian, and we are ready to proceed, Your Honor.
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            THE COURT: All right.
            MS. KHACHATOURIAN: Good afternoon, Your Honor.
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            THE COURT: Thank you, Ms. Smith.
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            MR. HUA: Good afternoon, Your Honor. Nelson Hua
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   for Wistron, Wiwynn, and SMS. We're ready to proceed, Your
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   Honor.
            THE COURT: All right. Thank you. Good enough.
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            Let me see, we are here on the Plaintiff's motion.
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   So let me turn it over first to counsel for Plaintiff.
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            MR. PAUNOVICH: Thank you, Your Honor. Joe
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   Paunovich on behalf of Alacritech.
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            We're here today on a motion to set a case
   schedule in this matter after the conclusion of PTAB
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   proceedings before the Patent Trial and Appeals Board.
            As Your Honor may recall, this is a case that
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   dates back to 2016, and in December of 2017, the parties
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   had reached a stipulated agreement to stay the case through
   the final determinations of -- by the PTAB with respect to
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   the IPRs filed by the Defendant group.
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            We did reach that stage, and then had a
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   conversation with Defendants about setting an agreed-upon
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   schedule for the case, at which point we learned that
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   Defendants were unwilling to set a schedule and were
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   seeking to continue the stay in this matter subject to the
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appeals that are pending from some of those PTAB proceedings.

From our perspective, we believe that under the parties' stipulated agreement, the case should proceed to trial at this time. At the time of the stay, we were approximately four months from trial. As I read the briefing, as I understand Defendants' argument, one of the primary criticisms of our request here today is that they are contending that we are seeking to re-open and basically re-conduct the case.

I want to be very clear with the Court that that is not at all what we are seeking. The schedule that we had proposed and did not get a response from Defendants on was frankly in an interest to try to reach an agreed-upon schedule that would get us to trial.

We would be perfectly comfortable bringing us right back to essentially the four-month schedule that we had to proceed to trial. Most of the discovery that was subject to certain limited disputes that were pending before the Court at the time of the stay has actually been agreed upon in the stipulation, that it would just -- it would be provided on a more speedy track by the Defendants.

The proposal that we made was in the hope of reaching an agreed-upon schedule. If Defendants are comfortable with the schedule that they already agreed to

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   in that stipulated stay, we can certainly have this case on
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   track to move very quickly to trial.
            In terms --
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            THE COURT: Mr. Paunovich, what is your thinking
   on proposing that we go forward to a trial, even on the
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   cases as to which the PTAB invalidated -- or even on the
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   claims as to which the PTAB found them invalid?
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            MR. PAUNOVICH: Sure. So as it currently stands
   in the PTAB rulings, there's no universe where we will not
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   go to trial in this matter. There are a number of the IPRs
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   in which claims -- the claims of validity was sustained.
   Whatever criticisms Intel and the other Defendants have of
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   that, the reality is those petitions have now been vacated.
   There is no right to appeal on them, and we will go to
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   trial on those claims.
            And it's not much different than as we understand
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   this Court's typical precedent, assuming prior to stay, if
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   you have a set of asserted claims and some but not all of
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   those claims are preliminarily found to be invalid by a
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   PTAB board, the normal procedure would be to proceed in the
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   absence --
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            THE COURT: By "preliminarily found," you mean
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   just that the IPR was instituted?
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            MR. PAUNOVICH: No, I do not, Your Honor.
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            For example, in the Personal Audio case, this --
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Judge Gilstrap had actually allowed both claims that had
their validity sustained, as well as some claims that had
been invalidated at a final written decision before the
PTAB to proceed to trial.
        THE COURT: Are you talking about Judge Clark's
opinion?
        MR. PAUNOVICH: I apologize if I misspoke on -- on
the judge that handled that case. But I believe it's the
Personal Audio v. Google case here in this district.
thought it was Judge Gilstrap, but I may be mistaken on
that.
        THE COURT: There are a variety of Personal Audio
cases, so it's kind of hard to keep up with. But the one
that I saw mentioned in the brief was out of Beaumont, but
if --
        MR. PAUNOVICH: You know, I can -- I've got the
citation here in my table of authorities. I can give you
the --
        THE COURT: Well, frankly, it doesn't matter. I'm
still just trying to figure out what would be the point in
staying the case for the PTAB to address these claims if
we're just going to go forward the same way regardless of
what the PTAB says?
        MR. PAUNOVICH: Well, part of the reason, we had
narrowed at the time of the stay to 16 claims in the case,
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as Your Honor I'm sure can appreciate. Although the Court required that amount of narrowing, typically parties would narrow further before or at the time of trial.

I do expect that in a case like this, it simply would be infeasible in a matter of a week to try a case on the full complement of 16 claims. From our perspective, given the way that some of the decisions had come down, institution decisions at that time, there was some benefit to seeing and understanding what -- how is the PTAB going to weigh in on the remaining asserted claims in this case? And can we -- will we be able to make an informed decision about what claims would be appropriate to ultimately take to trial?

It's certainly our perspective on those, many of the claims that were preliminarily found invalid by the PTAB, which remain on appeal, number one, they do still -are still entitled to presumption of validity, but even beyond that, there are some that are very clear as day, in our opinion, will ultimately be reserved and will end up as part of this trial.

And we'll --

THE COURT: I'm trying to understand the language you're using. When you say preliminarily found by the PTAB, you're referring to the final decisions of the PTAB, but you're calling them preliminary because they're subject

to appeal to the Circuit? 1 2 MR. PAUNOVICH: That's right. That's right. Your Honor, the claims that have been invalidated by the PTAB, 3 by the administrative board, are not canceled immediately, and, in fact, they are -- are still entitled to their 5 presumption of validity pending appeal. 6 7 That's been held that -- that's been held by a number of Courts. It's -- I think -- we think it's plain 8 as day in the statute. And that to assume that they are 9 invalid at that stage is just not appropriate on this 10 11 posture. 12 THE COURT: I'm having trouble understanding why 13

we would go to trial on claims that the PTAB has found invalid.

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You're -- I have never thought that I should assume that the PTAB's findings either way would be reversed. Similarly, we typically do go to trial on claims that the PTAB has allowed to survive, even though they're subject to appeal by the Defendant.

MR. PAUNOVICH: Absolutely. And I think part of that relates to the fact that we do have three claims that have been sustained as valid, and that, again, under no universe will those claims not go to trial. And I think what's unique about this case is although some of the claims relate to two different technologies, there is a

substantial overlap in the documents and witnesses and claims, frankly, including the invalidity claims that will be raised in this case.

And so the -- the notion that we would go to trial on those claims that have been sustained as valid and then possibly after an appeal that may not conclude for as much as 12 to 15 months, then come -- turn around, come back, re-conduct discovery, and hold a second trial on those claims that come out of those appeals would be a significant duplication of Court and party resources.

We -- the very same witnesses that we deposed in this case and the witnesses from our end that were deposed speak to and testify about both of these technologies and the same patents and claims. Although the technologies have some -- do have differences, ultimately, we're going to be presenting what is largely the same body of evidence at trial. And so under that circumstance where we do have surviving claims and other claims that should be tried along with those claims, we do think it's appropriate to try them at the same time.

THE COURT: Which can also be done if the case remains stayed until the Federal Circuit acts on the appeals from the PTAB.

MR. PAUNOVICH: That's certainly true, Your Honor, and part of the reason that although the parties'

stipulated agreement was not that it -- the stay would continue through the time of appeals but rather a negotiated and stipulated stay was that it would end at the conclusion of the -- where we received final written decisions on the last of their final IPRs.

The -- we never agreed to stay the case through the conclusion of appeals to the Federal Circuit, and part of the reason is some of the factors that we addressed anticipating what the Defendant group would address in its brief. Number one, that there would be no simplification of issues here. We are still going to present what amounts to essentially the same body of evidence, documents, witnesses, et cetera, at trial, whether it's on the sustained claims or a combination of the sustained claims and those that remain on appeal.

There is no claim construction or invalidity defense that will ultimately be resolved on this appeal that would not also be subject or represented in this trial. In fact, I'm not aware of any claim construction position that remains in dispute.

This Court, as you know, as Your Honor has previously ruled, claim construction is complete in this case. We've substantially completed discovery in this case. We completed expert reports. We were in the midst of taking expert depositions, and just four months out from

trial at the time when we agreed to a limited stay through the time of final written decisions.

This is consistent with how other -- other Courts have handled this before. For example, the Olaplex/L'Oreal trial, that happened just a few weeks ago in the District of Delaware in which one of the two patents had every single claim invalidated. It nevertheless proceeded to trial for the very same reasons that we're stating here, that the claims are still entitled to a presumption of validity. There were other claims, part of a second patent, that remained valid, had not been invalidated by the PTAB, and the Court found it appropriate under that circumstance, given all the other factors that the Court obviously considers in kind of weighing whether or not there should be a stay, to proceed to trial.

And there's a bit more here, Your Honor. Part of our negotiated stay was that it would go through the final written decision, and the only way a stay would continue is if the party seeking that stay demonstrated good cause. We don't believe that Defendants can demonstrate that on any of the factors that would -- the Court would typically consider in issuing a stay. There's no hardship to Defendants. They're going to have to go to trial anyway. They're going to have to contend with and deal with this evidence, documents, witnesses, et cetera.

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There's simply no reason to put off under this circumstance where the prejudice to Alacritech is significant. We've waited 19 months longer than what we expected. We think the statistics that were presented by the Defendants are incorrect, that at the earliest, we're looking at 12 to 15 months from now. And if we stay everything until that time, we're in essence agreeing or implementing a stay that by the time we would get to trial in this matter, it's going to be in excess of three years. THE COURT: You know, your argument only makes sense to me if I conclude that going to trial on all the claims, those that the PTAB found invalid and those that it didn't, involves pretty much the same evidence and the same investment of time. And is that what you're contending? MR. PAUNOVICH: I do think that there is a substantial overlap -- we believe and have stated there is a substantial overlap in the documents and witnesses that we would present regardless of whether the sustained claims go to trial now by themselves or with a broader set of claims that remain subject to the appeal. THE COURT: So you have the same experts on all of the 16 claims that you had narrowed your case to? MR. PAUNOVICH: That's right, Your Honor. two experts that will be testifying at trial, Dr. Kevin Almeroth and Mr. Lance Gunderson, our technical and damages

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experts respectively. They did provide opinions on each of
the claims. They would be presenting substantially the
same opinions at trial, independent of which of these
claims ultimately go.
        Part of the reason, though, we do believe it's
important that these be tried together is ultimately it
does come down in -- on some level to a damages base.
        There is -- although we believe that it's not
nearly as sort of black and white in terms of the split
between the two technologies that are at issue, it's -- you
know, frankly, there's been more of the products that have
been sold that include one of the technologies than the
other. And so ultimately, presenting on one technology at
trial which relates to certain of the claims and leaving
the other out really could lead to all sorts of problems in
a second trial.
        THE COURT: Well, I was following you right until
the end.
        You're -- obviously, that was going to be the next
question is how are you going to handle the damages to
separate out the damages relating to the claims that have
been invalidated and those that haven't in the event that
you lose the appeal?
        MR. PAUNOVICH: Absolutely, Your Honor.
        The Federal Circuit's recently spoken to this in
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the WesternGeco decision in which the Federal Circuit said
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   you need to look at and assign -- you need to ask the jury
   to assign damages on a patent-by-patent, claim-by-claim
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   basis so that ultimately they're able to determine if in
   these sorts of concurrent PTAB proceedings, if something
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   gets invalidated down the way on appeal or what have you,
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   you can go back and say, all right, what is the ultimate
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   damages that are appropriate here?
            THE COURT: And is that the way your damages
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   expert reports have been written so far?
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            MR. PAUNOVICH: Well, actually, how it's addressed
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   and just to use as an example, since I tried the
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   Olaplex/L'Oreal case here just recently, what we did in the
   verdict form, and I think this is becoming more -- the
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   practice and norm subject to the WesternGeco precedent, is
   that on your verdict form, you would ask the jury to assign
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   a damages award with respect to each patent that's in suit,
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   and then commit to the Court -- and we -- there's fairly
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   common jury instructions for this to allow the Court to
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   remit if appropriate down to a lower amount.
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            If -- if, for example, there was one of the
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   patents because of its issue date or an expiration date
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   might be subject to a lower damages amount but that patent
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   ultimately gets invalidated, you can go back to the verdict
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   form and say, well, for this particular patent, it was this
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amount of damages, and it -- it applies to this particular
period. I can pull that out. And I understand and know,
you know, what my remaining damages are.
        THE COURT: My question is, have your experts
written their opinions in that manner?
        MR. PAUNOVICH: Yes, Your Honor, they have.
        THE COURT: Okay.
        MR. PAUNOVICH: There are -- there are schedules
for each of the patents that apply to the relevant periods,
and I would be able to provide opinions directly from the
reports based on that.
        THE COURT: All right. If you are given a choice
of proceeding to trial on the claims that have survived the
PTAB or having the case stayed pending the Federal
Circuit's review of the PTAB's rulings, which would you
elect?
        MR. PAUNOVICH: I hope that's not a question I'm
asked to answer, but you're asking me it.
        We don't think it would be -- ultimately, we think
this is an up or down decision, that we should be going to
trial on the complete complement of claims or that it
should be stayed through the time of the Federal Circuit
deciding the appeals. We think that there's lots of
reasons why it's appropriate to proceed now, not the least
of which is the significant prejudice to Alacritech, the
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fact that we could legitimately end up in a situation where
I fully respect the positions the Defendants have advanced,
but going to trial potentially on just video deposition
testimony is not a way to try a case.
        We have -- we filed our case back in 2016.
agreed to an abbreviated and short stay through the final
written decisions. Our client, who's approaching 80 years
old, as well as his co-inventors, would like to have their
day in court.
        They were able to succeed in maintaining the
validity of at least some of the claims, and because of the
duplication in documents and witnesses and the fact that
it's not going to require new expert reports or things of
that nature to address that disparity or -- or frankly to
address any outcome that might happen in the Federal
Circuit, that can all be dealt under WesternGeco in the
verdict form, we would respectfully request that the Court
set a schedule and allow us to go to trial now.
        THE COURT: Okay. I have not -- I have not
forgotten my question. Have you?
        MR. PAUNOVICH: No, Your Honor. We would -- if
that is the only option, we would prefer to stay the case
through the Federal Circuit appeal.
        THE COURT: Okay. Tell me, the last thing I
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wanted to get from you before we hear from the Defendants,

after which I'll give you a chance to respond, is if we 1 2 proceed in the fashion that you're proposing, how would we ever get the efficiency that the PTAB is supposed to 3 provide to us unless they end up invalidating all of the claims? What -- what efficiency have we gained from these 5 IPR proceedings if we just go forward with everything, 6 7 notwithstanding the PTAB's ruling? MR. PAUNOVICH: Well, the point that I raised 8 first off, Your Honor, that I do think that Alacritech --9 10 although we're not here to acknowledge strengths or weaknesses in any particular claims, I think we do have an 11 12 understanding of where at least on those claims that have 13 been preliminarily invalidated by the PTAB, that -- you know, which we think stands a very high likelihood of being 14 15 reversed on appeal. 16 And I would expect that we will be prepared to narrow the asserted claims in this case further so that 17 18 we're not just sort of spinning our wheels on claims that 19 maybe are less likely to be reversed on appeal. 20 THE COURT: Okay. And give me a short version of 21 the error that you're asserting to the Circuit to get the 22 PTAB reversed. 23 MR. PAUNOVICH: For example, there are three 24 claims in which the Defendant groups in their IPRs 25 acknowledged that there were particular claim limitations

which were simply absent from the prior art, full end stop, admitted by their expert in the IPR proceedings.

And instead, what they did was attempt to fill the gap, the absence of those limitations in the prior art by saying, well, I'm a person of ordinary skill in the art, and I would have simply invented not one, not two, but three complex scripts that would address and ultimately disclose -- they would be these elements that are acknowledged as missing from the prior art.

This was all under testimony of their expert.

Ultimately, the Defendants' group -- the groups that were filing the IPRs were able to urge the PTAB board to adopt this line of reasoning, which was fundamentally inconsistent, has been repeatedly overturned, outright reversals, not remands, but overturned by the Federal Circuit where they say, look, you have not met your burden when you've acknowledged a missing limitation and you simply backfill it through expert testimony purporting to be a person of ordinary skill in the art. Rather in that instance, you've had a fundamental dispositive failure of proof. And the appropriate remedy in that circumstance is an outright reversal.

We -- we believe very strongly in the case law that we've cited and now briefed to the Federal Circuit that this will be a valid basis for an appeal, at least on

those three claims, among others.

I wasn't prepared to fully address all of the merits of those IPR appeals here, but that one stands out as particularly salient to the discussion we're having here right now, because I think there's a very real world under the precedent of our Federal Circuit that those claims are coming back fully alive and will be part of the trial in this matter.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you, Mr. Paunovich.

MR. PAUNOVICH: Thank you, Your Honor.

MR. GILLAM: Your Honor, Gil Gillam. I'm here speaking on behalf of Intel but also on behalf of the rest of the Defendants, as well.

Although if there are certain questions directed to each one of the Defendants, they would be happy to answer those if there are individual questions.

Whatever the stipulation was and whatever it meant, Your Honor, we surely did not stipulate to go to trial on claims that were held to be invalid by the PTAB.

And I think what the Court asked Mr. Paunovich a moment ago is -- is certainly instructive of the problem that we face here as we sit here right now.

What was the purpose of the stay if what the PTAB did doesn't mean anything? And that's what they're asking us to do here. Of the 13 -- of the 16 claims that they

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asserted in this case, 13 were held -- it's not a preliminary determination, it's a final written decision of the PTAB -- they were held to be invalid.
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Now, the only appeals that have been -- that we're concerned with here today, because timing seems to be of some import to the Plaintiffs in this case, the appeals that we're concerned about here today are the appeals of the Plaintiffs of those decisions. Now, there's some other appeals that we've talked about in the briefs of being things we may appeal or things like that, we're not concerned about those.

The only appeals we're concerned about today and that we're asking that the Court continue the stay on are the appeals raised by the Plaintiffs as a part of their appellate process and what was done with the PTAB.

THE COURT: And are you suggesting that those appeals are on a shorter track than the Defendants' appeals?

MR. GILLAM: We do believe, Your Honor, that -that when you -- I think the briefing is somewhat unclear
on that. We believe that when you look at the time table
for the appeals, that the time -- the time table for the
appeals, they should be resolved probably within 9 months.
They seem to think it's 12 to 15 months.

But whether it's 9 months or it's 12 months, we

don't believe that's a significant difference insofar as these particular appeals are concerned.

THE COURT: Can you address the argument that going to trial on the claims that survive would not be materially different in terms of the expense and effort as going to trial on all of the 16 elected claims?

MR. GILLAM: Well, first of all, Your Honor, I think it -- it's of some importance that both the Plaintiff and the Defendant seem to believe that it's not reasonable to go to trial on those three as opposed to all 16.

But taking that and putting it aside for a moment, there is some overlap in the patents, and it's similar enough that we believe what the Fed Circuit will have to say with respect to these appeals -- and I'm not well versed in what the appellate issues are -- but what the Fed Circuit does have to say with respect to these particular appeals are going to be important with respect to what this Court does with these particular patents.

I think all these claims have a priority date that go back to the same provisional patent. I think that's true. And so we think it will be important to hear what the Fed Circuit has to say. We think it doesn't make any sense to -- particularly in the short time table that we're dealing with here -- to go and have a -- what appears to be nothing more than a mishmash of potential claims that may

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be -- we believe, by the way, Your Honor, that there's a
very small chance that these -- that these claims will be
reversed on appeal or that the decision of the PTAB will be
reversed. We think they'll be -- they'll all be withheld
obviously.
        That being said, what we're talking about here
today, at least what I've heard is, is that let's -- let's
let them choose and decide amongst these other -- let's
first go with all 16 claims, and then let us decide what
some other claims -- or what might be held within the
middle of these claims, which ones we'll choose and things
like that.
        None of that makes any sense with respect to
what's already been done, and that's with respect to claims
that have been held invalid by the PTAB. None of it makes
sense at all.
        THE COURT: Well, do you dispute the argument that
Mr. Paunovich made that the Court in Delaware recently
decided that it was appropriate to go to trial on both
claims that survived and claims that didn't while the
appeals from the PTAB were pending?
        MR. GILLAM: I read that case. Your Honor, I
thought it was called Liqwid versus L'Oreal, and that was
the one that was in the brief. The fact situation in that
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particular case seemed to be different than what we're

talking about here. It seems that that was a two-patent case but also a case dealing with misappropriation of trade secrets as well as breach of contract. The time table was completely different than what we're talking about here. I think only one of the claims — or one of the patents that were asserted had been held invalid. The other one I believe was held to be valid.

The parties were direct competitors in that case, whereas they're not in this particular case. And so why the Court made the determination to go forward in that case, I don't know. It seems like the magistrate's opinion with respect to his decision was that he simply disagreed with what the determination of the PTAB was. The District Court seemed to agree with that, and they decided to go forward.

I have never seen something like that in this district at all, and that is going forward on a case which has been determined to be -- or with a patent that's been determined to be invalid by the PTAB.

THE COURT: What do you say about the Personal Audio decision?

MR. GILLAM: The Personal Audio decision, Your

Honor, was a decision -- I think it was a Judge Clark

decision, and from my reading of Personal Audio, the facts
in that particular case, again, were somewhat different

than what we're talking about here.

In that particular case, unlike this one, there were two-thirds, I believe, of the patents that were challenged in that case were held to be valid, or not unpatentable or not invalid by the PTAB as opposed to what we have here.

Here we have 13 of the 16 which were held to be invalid. The stage of the litigation was different than what we're talking about here. At the time of that decision, the -- I don't think any fact discovery had occurred. The Plaintiff waited less than two years to file their lawsuit, as opposed to 14 years that we have here. And so the decision was -- or rather the fact situation was completely different than what we have in this particular case.

So we believe that Personal Audio is distinguishable from what we have here.

THE COURT: But is it your understanding that

Judge Clark's decision in Personal Audio was to go to trial

on patents that had been invalidated by the PTAB?

MR. GILLAM: I don't think that's what the decision was. I think he said we're going -- we're not going to continue to stay the case. Now, where it went from there, I'm not sure, but I don't believe they went to trial on that. I believe that case was resolved.

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THE COURT: Okay. Well, take to me if you would
about the argument that the -- one way or the other these
three claims that have not been invalidated are going to
end up being appropriate for trial and that a trial on the
whole claim set would be no more effort than a trial on the
three.
        MR. GILLAM: Well, it certainly would be, Your
Honor. We're talking about -- and I'll point out this, for
example.
        You asked Mr. Paunovich whether or not the expert
report distinguished between the -- between the patents.
We did a quick review over here, and I don't believe the
expert report does distinguish between the patents.
        THE COURT: You're talking about the damages --
        MR. GILLAM: Yes, sir.
        THE COURT: -- expert's?
        MR. GILLAM: The damages report.
        And so we don't have a damages report that -- that
does distinguish on a patent-by-patent basis. I believe it
is as it exists in its current form. It's simply -- pardon
me -- it's simply a damages number is what they have and an
analysis of how they got there.
        And so the other issue that I would point out
in -- with respect to that is that we're talking about two
patents versus six patents. They asserted six patents in
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this case. We're only talking about the two patents, and
most of the products are out by way of the invalidity
finding of the -- of the PTAB.
        And so -- well, I think we're talking apples and
oranges here with respect to trying to try those cases
together, the ones that were held to be invalid and the
ones that we -- that they contend exist or continue to be
valid or available to be tried today.
        THE COURT: All right.
        MR. GILLAM: And I'm happy to address the other
factors for the Court if you want me to. Insofar as the --
the prejudice, there was a discussion of Mr. -- of their
Plaintiff or their lead inventor who's nearing 80 years
old. I mean, at the time that they filed this particular
lawsuit, they waited some 14 or 16 years before they filed
it -- before they asserted these patents. It hasn't been a
long -- it has not been a lengthy stay from the time of
the -- of the stay and --
        THE COURT: When you talk about the 14 years,
you're just saying from issuance of the patent?
        MR. GILLAM: From the time of the -- from the time
they had the ability to assert these patents because they
felt that they were infringed.
         In fact, the Court -- this Court did an analysis
of the -- of the prejudicial factors when it denied a
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motion to stay that was urged early on in this case.
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   that was in -- it was in this very case. And this Court
   found that there was not substantial prejudice as it
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   existed at the time. And the situation hasn't changed now
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   from what it was back then, other than the man is a couple
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   of years older.
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            Now, he sat for a three-day deposition and did
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   fine there. You know, at what point in time do you get
   old? Certainly he's a couple years older than what we
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   were at a couple of years ago. But we have no evidence
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   really that's been presented as to any ailment that he's
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   got, any -- any issue that he has which is going to make
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   him incapable of being there for trial. And we certainly
   have offered or will offer the -- the right of these folks
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   to do a preservation deposition if they want to do it.
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            But we don't see that there's any prejudice to
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   them based upon where we sit today.
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            THE COURT: All right. We'll deal with that
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   afterwards. Don't worry about it. It works just as
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   well --
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            MR. GILLAM: You're going to need a new one, Your
22
           This one looks a little bit chewed up.
23
            THE COURT:
                        There will be a small fine.
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            MR. GILLAM: It won't be the first time, Your
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   Honor.
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That's fine. I don't know if any of THE COURT: the other Defendants want to be heard. If not, I'll give Mr. Paunovich a chance to answer that. Mr. Stephens? MR. STEPHENS: Your Honor, thank you. Just briefly, I want to mention the issue about whether or not there's any increased burden by trying these separately as opposed to together. In other words, are all the issues the same? Is all the evidence the same? And Mr. Gillam, of course, already addressed that. I just want to speak briefly to the issue for Intel in particular. The very large majority of products that are accused against -- Intel products that are accused of infringing include a feature that is only accused on patents that have been held invalid. So there's a very small number of products that are at issue in the three claims that were not considered by the PTAB and a much, much larger number of individual products that are accused under the patents that were held invalid. And so that would require considerably more witnesses, a bunch of additional documentary evidence, additional expert testimony because these features are completely different and independent and deployed in different products, even though they work, you know,

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related to the same underlying protocol. So they're not unrelated, but they're deployed completely separate in the products. So there is a pretty substantial mismatch in terms of the evidence that will be presented at trial. That's all I wanted to say, Your Honor. THE COURT: Mr. Stephens, can you address your understanding of the expected timeline for the appeal that the Plaintiffs have pending in the Circuit now? MR. STEPHENS: Yes. What Mr. Gillam said is completely consistent with my understanding. We filed those briefs. Our opposition briefs were filed about two weeks ago, I believe. So I think that Alacritech's reply briefs are due at the end of October, and the last one will be filed the first week -- I'm sorry, maybe the first week of October, and the last one will be filed the first week of December. So we believe that roughly nine months is the right number. It is possible it could take a bit longer, but we don't think it's going to take 15 months. 12 months would be at the outside. It's also possible that these decisions will come down quickly because the PTAB appeals are often decided via Rule 36 where there's no written decision. So we think there's a very high likelihood that that could happen here too. So it actually could happen substantially quicker than nine months.

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They will all be argued together, by the way.
                                                       So
we think that the timeline is relatively abbreviated.
        THE COURT: All right.
        MR. STEPHENS: Thank you, Your Honor.
                    Thank you, Mr. Stephens.
        THE COURT:
        MR. COX: Your Honor, Brady Cox for Dell. I just
want to address real briefly a question you asked about
overlap of evidence as it applies to Dell specifically.
        We have products from different suppliers that are
accused of infringement in this case that have different
features that are accused of infringement. The Broadcom
products that Dell uses and that are accused of
infringement are only accused based on the features that
are at issue with the patents that currently stand
invalidated.
        And so whether those products come in or not will
vary depending on if we're trying the, you know, surviving
claims versus all the claims. And Dell also has
counterclaims for breach of contract alleging that these
Broadcom products are licensed, and I think how those
counterclaim are presented may vary depending on if the
Broadcom products are in or out.
        THE COURT: All right. Thank you, Mr. Cox.
        MR. COX: Thank you, Your Honor.
        THE COURT: Mr. Paunovich?
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Oh. 1 2 MR. GILLAM: One other thing, Your Honor. I did not address the question of the reopening of evidence or 3 what has been proposed, and I don't want to take the 4 Court's time on that unless the Court is in the process 5 of not continuing the stay in this case. We would have --6 7 would have something to say about that in the event that the Court makes that determination. 8 THE COURT: Well, this would be the time to 9 address that. 10 11 MR. GILLAM: Well, the problem is, Your Honor, 12 I've heard what Mr. Paunovich said a few moments ago, but 13 the -- the proposed schedule that they have issued in this case or rather that they have proposed in this case is 14 15 really about two months of unfetterred discovery is what 16 they've got. They've got two months of fact discovery built into their schedule. 17 18 Now, at the time that this case was stayed, fact discovery was closed, completely closed. A lifting of the 19 20 stay takes us -- or should take us back to the status quo. 21 THE COURT: And I think Mr. Paunovich said that 22 he'd be willing to accept that. 23 MR. GILLAM: Well, and that's -- that's fine, Your 24 Honor, because the only thing that the stipulation agreed

was that within 45 days of the stay ending, that the

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Defendants would provide updated financial information to
reflect sales and revenues relating to the accused products
received during that time period. And that's all we agreed
to. And so that's the deal.
        So we would not agree to anything beyond that, and
if the Court is of a different opinion as to where we're
going today, then we certainly would have the
opportunity -- or want the opportunity to talk that
through.
        THE COURT: All right.
        MR. GILLAM:
                    Thank you.
                    Thank you, Mr. Gillam.
        THE COURT:
        MR. PAUNOVICH: Your Honor, I have a few points
I'd like to address, but I'll start with the last one
raised by Mr. Gillam.
        The stipulation, Docket Entry 449, included not
just a supplement of financials, but also in Paragraph 8 at
Page 2, Intel had agreed to provide supplemental evidence
relating to certain additional products including one or
more accused ethernet controllers sold from 2010 once the
stay was lifted. This was part of the negotiated
stipulation.
        There were a handful of limited -- discovery was
not fully closed, as Mr. Gillam had said. There were a
handful of limited discovery motions that were pending and
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set for hearing. Not all of the briefing was fully complete since some were filed at different times, not by significant times, but some that were pending ultimately dismissed as moot in light of the stay subject to being re-raised with the Court.

We have undertaken a review of those motions, and part of the reason -- many of them are moot and would have no need to be presented to the Court, but part of the reason we had proposed the schedule that we did was the fact that there were some motions for both sides,

Defendants as well as Plaintiffs, that were pending.

We are certainly happy to discuss those. As I understand the sur-reply filed by Defendants, they offered to do so. If a schedule is set in this case at the same time as the negotiated stipulation sets forth, there is certain informations, financials and other product information, that was agreed to be provided.

So it wasn't that we were proposing some wide, unfetterred set of discovery. There was a cabined universe that I think the parties fully knew and understood at the time that the stay was lifted.

Circling back to the beginning of Defendants'

presentation, I do want to just bring the Court back to

Personal Audio and the Liqwid/Olaplex, so they were both

Plaintiffs in Delaware that I represented. Those cases

really -- this case is on all four -- all fours with each of those cases.

In Personal Audio, there were eight claims out of a total of about 21 claims that were held invalid by the PTAB, and ultimately the Court, given the stage of the case, which was actually earlier than this case, although substantially along, which is a factor compelling -- or coming out against issuing a stay, the Court ultimately determined the trial should go forward on not just the patentable claims but those that were held preliminarily unpatentable.

The same thing -- exact same thing happened respectfully in the District of Delaware. I was lead counsel on that case. It had nothing to do with the fact that there were additional non-patented claims. One of our patents was fully invalidated, full end stop. It remains on appeal to this day. We went and tried that case in large part because claims are entitled to their presumption of validity, particularly in a case where you've got to split set of decisions, some that have been invalidated, some that haven't.

And in this instance, like that one in the Liqwid/Olaplex versus L'Oreal case, where you're going to be presenting ultimately substantially the same documents and witnesses, it makes a lot of sense for judicial

efficiency and party efficiency to try them at the same time.

I respectfully disagree with Defendants'
assertions about the differences in evidence that would be
presented here. As Your Honor -- I know it's been quite
some time, but Alacritech had proposed a representative
product stipulation. It was never responded to formally or
agreed upon by the Defendants.

Here -- here nor there, ultimately our experts presented their opinions based on representative products. It's not a universe that is unbound or materially different in any way that's going to be presented at trial.

Similarly, Mr. Gunderson offered a damages expert opinion that, yes, has an ultimate number if infringement was found on all of the patents, but we have schedules that are attached like they commonly are as part of a damages report. It breaks it down on a patent-by-patent basis.

So the opinions are there. Our expert would not have to supplement his report and would be able to present at trial testimony consistent with WesternGeco that would allow the jury to provide a verdict that is specific to each patent, and, therefore, there's not an issue of inconsistent rulings or an issue of a potential retrial. It would be fully consistent with how the Federal Circuit has told us we're supposed to try patent cases now.

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THE COURT: Can you point to any other case
besides the L'Oreal case from Delaware, which I will look
at, where the Court has gone forward with a trial on claims
that have been invalidated by the PTAB?
        MR. PAUNOVICH: Yeah, the Personal Audio is
another example. That was Judge Clark in Beaumont. I'm
sorry for misspeaking earlier.
        THE COURT: Now, that case, as I understand it,
didn't actually go to trial, but he did lift the stay.
        MR. PAUNOVICH: I believe it actually did go to
trial, but I may be -- I'm sorry, it ended up settling, but
ultimately they did agree -- the Court agreed that it was
going to go to trial, and then they settled on the eve of
trial.
        THE COURT: Okay. I will look at that one, as
well.
        MR. PAUNOVICH: And just to highlight Judge --
Judge Clark, what I think his reasoning was, that
ultimately a trial was going to be necessary in that case
regardless, and where you had this sort of substantial
overlap in the documents and witnesses, et cetera, it
didn't justify staying the case in that circumstance. I
think that's -- that's very similar and ultimately what
happened in Liqwid/Olaplex versus L'Oreal.
        And in this case, given how long we've waited now
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and what the negotiated stipulated stay was before, again,
we would respectfully request --
        THE COURT: And so are there any other cases that
you can point me to that speak to that?
        MR. PAUNOVICH: I believe we cited in our briefing
at Page -- I want to say 13, but it might have been the
Bettcher case, if I'm not mistaken.
                    There is a Bettcher case.
        THE COURT:
        MR. PAUNOVICH: And Hologic versus Minerva case.
        THE COURT: All right. I see those. I'm looking
at your table of authorities. I see Hologic and Bettcher.
        MR. PAUNOVICH: I don't want to misspeak on those.
I have a personal knowledge of the Olaplex case, which is
why -- and of the Personal Audio we're obviously very
familiar with, so I don't want to misstate to Your Honor.
        THE COURT: Okay.
        MR. PAUNOVICH: I'm sorry, so Footnote 4 -- I
apologize, Your Honor, I want to correct what I've just
told you.
        In Footnote 4 of our Docket No. 470, that's our
motion, we list a handful of other cases -- or two other
cases in addition to the Olaplex case, the Zoll Medical
Corp versus Respironics and One No. Corp versus Google,
which reached a similar conclusion --
        THE COURT: All right.
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MR. PAUNOVICH: -- as to Personal Audio, that is.
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            THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Paunovich.
            MR. PAUNOVICH: Unless Your Honor has any further
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   questions, we appreciate your time.
            THE COURT: Thank you.
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            MR. PAUNOVICH:
                            Thank you.
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            THE COURT: Anything else from the Defendants?
            MS. KHACHATOURIAN: Your Honor, if I may speak
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   from here.
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            THE COURT:
                        Sure.
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            MS. KHACHATOURIAN: Just on behalf of Cavium,
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   there was no motion to compel pending against Cavium before
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   the case was stayed at the time of the close of fact
   discovery. Therefore, fact discovery with respect to
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   Cavium was closed. There was no agreement by Cavium to
   provide any additional information on products. As far as
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   Cavium is concerned, based on the procedural history of the
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   case, fact discovery had closed, and we were moving
   forward.
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            Also with respect to Cavium, as Dell also stated,
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   the Broadcom issue applies to Cavium, as well. One of the
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   reasons why we are in this case is -- is to assist Dell and
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   to protect our products, but some of those products include
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   Broadcom.
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           And so in terms of moving forward, it wouldn't
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make sense. It becomes more complicated.
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            THE COURT: All right. Thank you.
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            MS. KHACHATOURIAN: Thank you, Your Honor.
            THE COURT: Thank you, Ms. Khachatourian.
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            Anyone else? No?
            All right. Well, I appreciate the arguments.
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   They've been helpful. We'll get something out promptly on
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   this.
            MR. PAUNOVICH: Thank you, Your Honor.
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            COURT SECURITY OFFICER: All rise.
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            (Hearing concluded at 4:22 p.m.)
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CERTIFICATION I HEREBY CERTIFY that the foregoing is a true and correct transcript from the stenographic notes of the proceedings in the above-entitled matter to the best of my ability. /S/ Shelly Holmes 7/13/2022 SHELLY HOLMES, CSR, TCRR Date CERTIFIED SHORTHAND REPORTER State of Texas No.: 7804 Expiration Date: 10/31/2023